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The record number of fifty-point daily moves in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1996—
forty-five in the first three quarters alone—has attracted considerable media attention. An
analysis traces this phenomenon to two basic causes:  the record level of the Dow and the return
of stock price volatility to post–World War II norms following several years of low volatility.
Large daily movements in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average have occurred frequently in 1996. These gyra-
tions, covered extensively by the business and popular
media, have led some to conclude that stock prices have
grown unusually volatile. One manifestation of this
volatility is the frequency with which the Dow has closed
up or down fifty or more points in a single day.1 Daily
moves of this size—unheard of ten years ago and only an
occasional occurrence until the start of this year—have
become almost commonplace in 1996, occurring forty-
five times during the first three quarters.
Analytically, we can attribute the increased fre-
quency of large daily moves in the Dow to two factors:
an increase in stock price volatility (measured in per-
centage terms) and a rise in the Dow’s level. Because
the Dow has increased sharply in recent years—by
more than 60 percent between 1992 and 1995 alone—a
given percentage change in the Dow translates to many
more points now than it did in the past. 
This edition of Current Issues explores the recent
volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the
context of these two factors, focusing on January
through September 1996. We show that although
volatility has increased in 1996, this rise actually
reflects a return to post–World War II norms from the
unusually low volatility experienced between 1992 and
1995. We also examine the extent to which an increase
in the Dow’s level raises the frequency of large daily
moves. Our analysis shows that when volatility is held
constant, a doubling of the Dow’s level causes a five-
fold increase in the number of days on which the index
closes up or down fifty points.2 A related exercise that
allows for variations in stock market volatility over
time reinforces these results. These findings suggest
that daily swings in the Dow of fifty points, until
recently an aberration, will continue to occur regularly.
Market Volatility in Recent Years
The market volatility of 1996 may have caught some
investors by surprise because stock prices were unusu-
ally stable in the recent past. Following the extreme
price movements of the late 1980s, market volatility
experienced a lull between 1992 and 1995 that accus-
tomed investors to relatively modest stock price 
fluctuations.
Three Measures of Volatility. Three different mea-
sures of the Dow’s daily volatility confirm that from
1992 to 1995 market volatility was at its lowest level in
decades (Chart 1):3
• The standard deviation of daily price changes,
a volatility measure commonly used by market
participants, peaked at 2.17 percent in the
tumultuous 1987 environment (panel A). It
then declined sharply over the next several
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level in three decades. 
• The Dow’s median absolute percentage
change, which represents the change in stock
prices on a typical day, followed a similar pat-
tern (panel A). It peaked most recently in 1987
and fell to a thirty-year low in 1995. 
• A third indicator of volatility is the number of
days on which the Dow registers a sizable
change. In 1987, there were forty-one days on
which the Dow was up or down 2 percent or more
(panel B). Daily moves of this size occurred
commonly through 1991 but then became far less
frequent:  there were only five 2-percent days in
the 1992-94 period and none in 1995. 
Following the tranquil 1992-95 period, this year’s
volatility has been a rude awakening for some investors.
Through September, standard deviation and median
absolute percentage change were both up by about 50
percent from their 1995 levels, and the (annualized)
number of 2-percent days had increased from zero to
five. Is this simply a return to historical norms, as the
three measures suggest, or is a new trend emerging?
Frequency Distribution of Returns.4 Another way to
compare recent market volatility with past experience
is to consider the frequency distribution of daily per-
centage changes in the Dow. For this comparison, our
reference period will be the years 1946 to 1994. By
sorting daily percentage changes in the Dow into size
categories, Chart 2 allows us to compare the market
volatility of 1995 and 1996 with this earlier experience. 
First, we note how 1995 differed from the reference
period. Small daily moves (of less than 0.5 percent)
occurred on an average of 41.0 days per quarter in
1995, 6.6 days more per quarter than in the reference
period. Conversely, the average number of large daily
moves (of 1 percent or more) was just 4.3 per quarter in
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Notes:  The horizontal lines in panel A represent standard deviation and median absolute percentage change computed for the overall 1946-96 period. The figure for 1996 in 
panel B is for the first three quarters, annualized.  
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1946-961995, compared with 11.0 for the reference period.
Thus, in comparison with 1946-94, 1995 was an unusu-
ally calm year for the market.
Volatility in 1996 has been more typical of the higher
levels of the past. Daily moves of less than 0.5 percent
have been slightly less common in 1996 than in the ref-
erence period, while moves of 0.5 to 1 percent have been
slightly more common. The number of large daily moves
(1 percent or more) per quarter has averaged 11.3 in
1996, virtually identical to the historical average of
11.0. These results confirm that the Dow’s volatility
(measured in percentage terms) returned to historical
norms in 1996 following a calm spell in 1995.5
Frequency of Fifty-Point Days
When reporting the stock market’s daily performance,
the media generally focus on the absolute magnitude of
changes in the Dow. To mirror this emphasis, we con-
sider the frequency with which the daily change in the
Dow has exceeded a fixed threshold of fifty points.
(Movements of this size only started occurring ten
years ago—the first such episode was on July 7, 1986,
when the Dow closed down sixty-two points. Before
1986, the Dow traded at such a low level—never above
1600—that daily moves of fifty points simply did not
occur.)  Between 1986 and 1995, the Dow’s number of
fifty-point days averaged just twelve per year and
showed no sign of increasing. In 1996, however, there
were forty-five such days in the first three quarters
alone. What accounts for this upsurge?
The Impact of a Higher Dow. While the 1996 rebound
in stock market volatility in percentage terms has
increased the frequency of fifty-point days, the level of
stock prices has also been a factor. The Dow climbed
dramatically in 1995 and reached 5600 for the first time
in February 1996. It fluctuated around that level for
several months, until surpassing 6000 in October. To
quantify the impact of a higher Dow on the frequency
of fifty-point days, we consider the following question:
If the distribution of daily percentage returns continued
to resemble what it was over the past five decades, what
relationship would exist between the Dow’s level and
the frequency of fifty-point days?
For this exercise, we use a Dow of 5600—the level
that characterized much of 1996. If the likelihood of a
given percentage move in the Dow were equal to its his-
torical frequency in 1946-95 (Chart 3),  then the proba-
bility of the Dow rising or falling by fifty points on a
given day would equal the proportion of trading days in
the historical period on which the size of the Dow’s
daily price change exceeded 0.89 percent (50 divided by
5600). Movements of this magnitude occurred on 2,672
of the 12,572 trading days in the historical period
(Chart 3, shaded areas), or 21.3 percent of the time. We
therefore estimate that when the Dow is at 5600 and
volatility is at its historical level, a daily move of fifty
points should occur with a probability of 21.3 percent,
or roughly once a week.
This analysis can be repeated for other levels of the
Dow as well. For example, the estimated probability of
a fifty-point day when the Dow is at 2800, half as high,
equals the proportion of days on which the Dow was up
or down by more than 1.79 percent (50 divided by
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Frequency Distribution of the Dow’s Daily Returns, 
1946-95
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Daily returns (percent)
Notes:  The shaded regions, representing days on which returns had an absolute 
value in excess of 0.89 percent, constitute 21.3 percent of the distribution. On
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estimated probability of just 3.9 percent.
A comparison of these two estimates produces a
strong implication:  If the historical distribution of
returns is an accurate guide to the future, a doubling of
the Dow’s level does not merely double the likelihood of
a fifty-point day, it increases it fivefold.6 By repeating
this exercise for a wide range of values, we can express
the probability that the Dow will rise or fall fifty points
on any given day as a function of its level (Chart 4).
Variations over Time. The extent to which daily returns
vary is itself variable. Although Charts 3 and 4 depict the
average frequency with which fifty-point moves in the
Dow occur, they convey no sense of the extent to which
this frequency varies over time. This variation is substan-
tial. More than half of the days on which the Dow has
closed up or down by more than 2 percent between 1946
and 1995 were concentrated in just six years:  1946,
1974, 1975, 1982, 1987, and 1988 (Chart 1, panel B). It
is therefore useful to consider how volatile stock prices
have been in different historical periods.
The calendar quarter is our unit of analysis. For each
quarter from 1946 to 1995, we calculate the number of
days on which the percentage change in the Dow was
large enough to have caused the index at a given level to
move at least fifty points. This approach allows us to
use 200 quarters of market history as natural experi-
ments that demonstrate the variation of stock price
volatility over time.
First, consider how infrequently daily moves of fifty
points would have occurred had the Dow been at a level
of 2800—where it stood in early 1990—throughout the
entire 1946-95 sample period (Chart 5, panel A). In the
median calendar quarter of the sample (the quarter that
ranks in the middle of the distribution), the number of
days on which fifty-point moves would have been pos-
sible is only one. In addition, more than a third of the
quarters (71 of 200) had no days that could have caused
such moves, and nearly 75 percent of the quarters (146
of 200) had fewer than three days that could have
accomplished this. 
Repeating this analysis using a Dow level of 5600
offers a very different picture (Chart 5, panel B). The
number of days per quarter on which fifty-point moves
could have occurred is as high as forty-four; the median
quarter has thirteen, or one per week. Seldom (in just 18
of 200 quarters) was this number below five. 
Thus, had the Dow been at a level of 5600 through-
out the post–World War II period, it would have experi-
enced a high frequency of fifty-point days. How closely
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Days with Percentage Changes Sufficient to Cause 
a Fifty-Point Move in the Dow:  Quarterly, 1946-95
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  Panel A tabulates the number of days per quarter on which the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average closed up or down more than 1.79 percent (50 divided 
by 2800). Panel B tabulates the number of days per quarter on which the Dow 
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34 33does the Dow’s performance in 1996 conform to this
pattern? The Dow closed up or down fifty points on
eighteen days in the first quarter. This level of volatil-
ity, while above the median, has ample historical prece-
dent. Moreover, the number of fifty-point days in the
second and third quarters, twelve and fifteen, respec-
tively, was quite close to the median. In sum, this
approach further confirms that volatility in 1996 has
been typical of the postwar years. 
Disentangling Volatility from Price Level
As we have noted, the frequency with which substantial
daily moves in the Dow Jones Industrial Average occur
depends on the Dow’s level and its volatility in percent-
age terms. To evaluate the impact of each factor, we
compare the actual number of fifty-point days that
occurred each year with the number that would be
expected to occur, solely on the basis of the Dow’s
level, under normal volatility conditions (Chart 6).7
From 1987 to 1991, the number of fifty-point days gen-
erally exceeded these expectations because of the mar-
ket’s high volatility. In 1992-95, the Dow surged 
61 percent to record levels, sharply boosting the
expected number of fifty-point days. These expecta-
tions were not realized, however, because of an offset-
ting factor:  the Dow’s unusually low volatility during
those years. So strong was the effect of this low volatil-
ity that, notwithstanding the Dow’s much higher level,
daily moves of fifty points were actually no more com-
mon in 1992-95 than they had been previously.
This year, as volatility has reverted to a level more
typical of the past half-century, the frequency of fifty-
point days has risen markedly, to about its expected
level. Seen in this light, the jump in the number of fifty-
point days in 1996 does not appear to be a temporary
phenomenon. If this year’s level of market volatility
persists, we may only just be starting to feel the impact
that record valuations of the Dow can have on the fre-
quency of large daily moves.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows that the unprecedented frequency
with which fifty-point moves in the Dow Jones
Industrial  Average have occurred in 1996 is due to two
factors:  the record level of the Dow and the return of
stock market volatility to the higher level characteristic
of the post–World War II years. 
Although considerations such as business cycle
effects and the direction in which stock prices have
moved might help explain volatility, our focus has been
on the consequences of market volatility, not its causes.
We have shown how, given the historical distribution of
percentage daily returns over the past five decades, a
doubling of the Dow from its early 1990 level of 2800
to a level of 5600 has increased the probability of a
fifty-point day more than fivefold.   
If, as we find, daily moves of this size can be
expected to occur approximately once a week at current
stock price and volatility levels, intraday moves of this
size will by definition occur at least as often. Analysis
of the type presented here might therefore contribute to
the ongoing discussion of the rules limiting computer-
guided trading on days when the Dow has risen or
fallen fifty or more points. 
Notes
1. This fifty-point threshold, though chosen arbitrarily for the analy-
sis, has practical significance: it is the threshold at which New York
Stock Exchange rules limiting computer-guided trading go into
effect. We chose not to use a twenty-five-point threshold because
moves of this size now occur so frequently that they are no longer
noteworthy. Using a cutoff of seventy-five or a hundred points leads
to results that are qualitatively similar to what we find using a fifty-
point threshold. 
2. To simplify the discussion, we will refer to a price change of fifty
or more points as a “fifty-point” price change. 
3. The focus of this paper—why significant daily moves in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average seem to have become more common in
recent months—has guided our choice of data. We analyze the
Dow’s performance as opposed to that of other measures such as the
Standard and Poor’s 500 index because the Dow is the market index
that the business and the popular media emphasize most. We use
data on daily price changes, not intraday fluctuations, because these












Daily Moves in the Dow of Fifty Points or More
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The 1996 data are for the first three quarters, annualized. The 1996 level 
of the Dow is for September 30. The expected number of fifty-point days is 
defined as the sum of the probabilities of fifty-point daily moves for each day 
of the year, as calculated in Chart 4.
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4. For convenience, we will sometimes refer to percentage price
changes as “returns,” although the term “returns” is generally
defined by market observers to include dividends.
5. A more formal statistical test—known as the Kolmogorov test—
allows us to reject with 99 percent certainty the hypothesis that
returns for 1995 were drawn from the distribution observed for
1946-94 (D=0.132; p=0.0004). The test does not, however, reject
this hypothesis for returns in January–September 1996 (D=0.064;
p=0.4252). 
6. This fivefold increase occurs for current levels of the Dow rang-
ing from 5500 to 6000 and is even higher for levels of the Dow
below that range. The result follows mechanically from the shape of
the frequency distribution of daily returns depicted in Chart 3. The
key insight is that daily returns of a magnitude of 0.89 percent or
greater have occurred far more than twice as frequently as have
daily returns of double that magnitude. 
7. The percentage probability of a fifty-point day was computed for
each trading day of the year on the basis of the relationship shown
in Chart 4. These figures were then summed for all the days of the
year to arrive at the expected number of fifty-point days. 
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